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hile many people take our current banking system for 
granted, the system looked very different twenty-five 
years ago. At that time, interest checking (NOW) accounts did 
not exist and banks faced caps on the rate of interest that they 
could offer on savings accounts. Instead, when interest rates 
rose above the cap, banks offered free toasters or savings bonds 
to encourage the public to open an account. On the lending 
side, securitization had not yet taken hold. Most mortgages 
were made by savings and loans or thrifts that existed as very 
simple institutions. The thrifts financed their (long-term) 
mortgages, often thirty-year fixed-rate loans, with (short-term) 
deposits. When interest rates rose, banks faced liquidity 
problems and often reduced the amount of money available for 
loans, effectively leading to credit rationing. While this system 
performed adequately in a low-inflation world, its 
shortcomings were made clear with the inflation of the late 
1970s, leading to regulatory reforms that effectively 
deregulated the industry. 
As Jonathan McCarthy and Richard Peach convincingly 
document, deregulation of the banking industry had a profound 
impact on mortgage finance in this country. Today, most 
mortgages are originated by mortgage brokers and held by 
mortgage pools, often supported by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
whereas savings and loans originated most loans in the previous 
regime. While it is not surprising that such changes in the banking 
sector might have a strong impact on the housing market, given 
its strong reliance on high levels of credit, the McCarthy/Peach 
paper is the first to comprehensively link the behavior of the 
housing market to deregulation in the banking sector.
The paper presents two important and policy-relevant 
findings. First, monetary policy has a slower initial impact on 
housing investment than it did in the past. Second, demand for 
housing today is much more dependent on basic demand 
factors such as user costs and the amount of fees charged to 
originate mortgages. The authors argue that both results are 
due to the fact that shocks to supply and demand are more 
immediately reflected in prices and mortgage rates, while in the 
past, credit rationing in the banking sector limited the extent to 
which the housing market responded to demand factors. For 
the same reasons, they also argue that monetary policy had 
more immediate force to affect the housing market in the more 
regulated environment of the 1970s.
McCarthy and Peach arrive at these findings using two 
approaches: a reduced-form vector autoregression (VAR) 
model of monetary policy and a structural model of supply and 
demand in the housing market. To make comparisons over 
different policy regimes, they split the sample into two periods: 
1975-85 and 1986-2000. With twenty-six years of quarterly 
data, this is a relatively short period over which to split a 
sample, especially with the VAR methodology, but the authors 
are limited by the amount of available data. In this case, the best 
quality measure of house prices available, a price index of the 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), 
only begins in 1975. The short sample period makes it difficult 
to determine long-run impulse responses using a VAR, 
especially in the first sample period of eleven years from 1975 
to 1985. However, the authors’ principal finding involves the 
short-term response of housing investment to monetary 
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policy, which may be more plausibly estimated with existing 
data. This sample split is also a bit problematic when there are 
multiple events that separate the policy regimes in question. 
Nonetheless, the differences across periods are quite striking.
The first section of the paper presents evidence of the 
changes in the mortgage market. In part, initial fees have fallen 
substantially and consumers have moved toward adjustable-
rate mortgages (ARMs). Both are signs of increasing 
competition, as issuers have made it easier for homeowners 
to buy houses with smaller initial payments and less cash 
required at closing.1 Given that the ratio of ARMs has varied 
substantially after 1985, from between 15 and 65 percent of 
new originations, and points and fees have fallen as well, it is 
hard to choose a single type of mortgage rate to measure the 
cost of loans to consumers, who were clearly offered a wider 
menu of options after 1985. 
These structural changes have several implications for the 
authors’ analysis. First, the VAR results that include the 
mortgage interest rate in the simulations of a monetary policy 
shock may be hard to interpret. It seems surprising that 
mortgage rates appear to require five quarters to adjust fully to 
a 50-basis-point increase in the federal funds rate in today’s 
competitive environment, in which mortgages are priced off of 
the bond market and adjusted frequently within the day. 
Second, it is difficult to interpret the coefficient on a variable 
representing points and fees or even the loan-to-price ratio in 
a structural demand model without allowing for the fact that 
these variables are determined in part by supply and demand 
conditions in the housing market. Presumably lower fees or 
higher loan-to-value loans arise when prices are high and some 
consumers are facing additional hurdles to obtaining a loan. 
The good news is that the main results of the paper hold even 
when these variables are excluded.
Finally, it is always possible that the structural changes 
found in the article could potentially lead to biases in the data 
that are self-fulfilling. The house price indexes are obtained 
from OFHEO, which gets its micro data from transactions of 
properties with loans that were purchased by Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac. In the early part of the sample, these two 
government-sponsored entities (GSEs) had a small market 
share and thus fewer transactions. Later in the sample, the 
market share of GSEs goes up with securitization, potentially 
smoothing out measurement error in the house price index. 
Despite the potential seriousness of this problem, such biases 
probably do not create a major problem here. While such 
biases might plausibly impact the house price index, they do 
not explain why the residential investment series is equally 
volatile in the earlier years, a finding that is consistent with an 
impact of deregulation. In addition, this analysis uses the 
national house price index, which is still based on a relatively 
large number of transactions. This problem might be more of 
an issue with studies that focus on metropolitan areas, where 
samples are smaller. Of course, any changes in the geographic 
concentration of mortgages purchased by the GSEs over time 
might also impact the analysis, but there is no reason to believe 
that this issue would lead to a systematic bias. 
The structural supply and demand estimates share many 
similarities with previous studies, but nonetheless there are a 
number of important things to be learned from these estimates. 
Earlier studies have treated the whole time period as a single 
unit, rather than recognizing that the stark changes that have 
taken place in the mortgage market may have an impact on 
structural supply and demand estimates in the housing market. 
The authors should be credited with pointing out the 
differences in the housing market that take place after 1985 and 
are plausibly related to changes in the mortgage market.
Previous research on housing supply has found that the 
number of month’s supply of units on the market is strongly 
correlated with starts or investment, even after controlling for 
all other theoretical factors. These studies usually conclude that 
the importance of month’s supply is an indication of the 
inefficiency of the housing market and the slow adjustment of 
prices. McCarthy and Peach point out that month’s supply is 
correlated only in the early period, but not after 1985, 
suggesting that much of the inefficiency in the production of 
housing units may be related to inefficiencies in the mortgage 
market, rather than the price adjustment process. However, 
even in the later period of the model, prices make up only 
about 27 percent of the difference between actual and 
equilibrium prices within a year. These estimates still suggest a 
very inefficient housing market.
The results also indicate some of the same problems that 
other research has faced. For example, the coefficients on 
construction costs are often of the wrong sign and are never 
statistically different from zero. Problems with supply 
estimates using the cost index are likely caused by endogeneity 
between the cost of production and demand, that is, costs are 
high at times when demand for housing is high because of 
increased demand for scarce materials. Changes in user costs 
have a consistently small impact on demand, even in the later 
period, and are smaller than they are in some other studies.
Overall, the authors have done a creditable and very serious 
job of estimating the impact of monetary policy on the housing 
market. The paper makes the most of the available data, and for 
the most part, the results make intuitive sense and are 
convincingly argued. The fact that monetary policy now has 
less of a short-term impact on the housing market shows the 
sometimes perverse result of deregulation. As the mortgage 
market has become more competitive, regulatory intervention 
has less sway over the behavior of markets.Endnotes
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1. Adjustable-rate mortgages typically have a lower initial interest 
rate, making it easier for consumers to qualify for a loan when lenders 
apply fixed loan-to-income ratios to loan qualifications. 
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